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RESPONSE TO REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS IN
SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT
David G. Epstein*

1

Under the leadership of Dean Blake Morant, the Wake Forest
Law Review (the “Law Review”) presented a symposium: Contracts
in Context: Identity, Power and Contractual Justice. Robert Samuel,
the Executive Forum Editor of the Law Review, has asked me to
2
3
write a short scholarly response to one of the papers presented at
the symposium and later published in the Law Review, Reasonable
4
Expectations in Sociocultural Context (the “Article”) by Professor
5
Nancy S. Kim.
6
7
The Article starts (and ends) with the premise that contract
law should enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties. This
8
is a hard premise to challenge. And an even harder premise to
* George E. Allen Chair, University of Richmond Law School
1. Fourteen years ago, Dean Morant had written on contract law in
context. Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions
of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 890–99 (1997).
2. In responding to Robert’s kind invitation, I told him that, unlike Dean
Morant, Professor Kim, and the other Symposium participants, I am not a
contracts scholar; I just teach contract law to law students and law school
graduates studying for the bar exam. Nonetheless, I have written this short
response, which I hope is “scholarly” enough, because like everyone involved in
higher education (only more so), I am indebted to the late Tom Hearn, President
of Wake Forest University for twenty-two meaningful years.
3. I kind of feel like the a**hole that ruins faculty forums by running on
about his view of the presenter’s paper. Cf. Sally Jane, Workshop Etiquette,
THE CREATIVE WRITING M.F.A. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010, 7:33 PM), http://creative
-writing-mfa-handbook.blogspot.com/2010/12/workshop-etiquette.html
(explaining the old joke that if you look around and do not see an a**hole in a
room, you are the a**hole). I hope Professor Kim prepares a devastating
rejoinder showing how I misunderstood her article.
4. Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2010).
5. I do not think I know Professor Kim. However, I do know Professor
Kim’s work. One of Professor Kim’s earlier articles is cited in a contracts
casebook I coauthor. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS:
CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 626, 628 (3d ed. 2011) (My casebook coauthors want
Professor Kim to know that they both love Reasonable Expectations in
Sociocultural Context.)
6. Kim, supra note 4, at 641–42.
7. Id. at 668.
8. It would mean challenging not only Professor Kim but also Arthur
Linton Cobrin. See id. at 642 n.3.
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9

apply.
The Article recognizes the two problems with applying this
premise: (1) how does a court decide what expectations are
10
“reasonable,” and (2) what does a court do when the contracting
11
The Article then
parties have different reasonable expectations.
uses two cases to illustrate how “sociocultural dissonance between a
12
judge and contracting party” exacerbates these problems.
There must be a lot of “sociocultural dissonance between a judge
and a contracting party” who appears before her in terms of
13
education, income, and social status. I am just not sure that there
are a lot of cases in which that matters—at least not a lot of
14
reported cases.
For instance, Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc. —the
example of such sociocultural dissonance most familiar to law
15
students —arose from a Pepsi promotional campaign in which
“Pepsi Points” could be redeemed for various prizes.
Justin
Leonard, a twenty-one-year-old member of the “Pepsi Generation” to
whom Pepsi intended the commercial to appeal, sees a commercial
offering a Marine Harrier fighter jet for 7,000,000 Pepsi Points and
submits an order form to Pepsi.
After Pepsi responded, “The Harrier jet in the Pepsi commercial
is fanciful and is simply included to create a humorous and
16
When
entertaining ad,” Leonard sued for specific performance.
Pepsi moved for summary judgment, Leonard’s attorney argued that
9. I know that this is a sentence fragment but my eleventh grade English
teacher, Miss Alice Lindemann, told me that once I had a book published I could
use sentence fragments.
10. Kim, supra note 4, at 646. See also John Phillips, Protecting Those in a
Disadvantageous Negotiating Position: Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying
Doctrine, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 839 (2010) (“The problem is that
different judges view the reasonable expectations of the parties in quite
different ways, leading to diametrically opposing views as to the meaning of the
same document.”).
11. Kim, supra note 4, at 646–47.
12. Id. at 652. See also Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contract in
Context and Contract as Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 573 (2010) (“Her
article asserts that courts should take into consideration the social and cultural
backgrounds and identities of the parties in analyzing contract disputes.”).
13. Kim, supra note 4, at 652. But cf. William H. Honan, Roman L. Hruska
Dies at 94; Leading Senate Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1999, at B8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/27/us/roman-l-hruska-dies-at-94
-leading-senate-conservative.html (“Even if [Supreme Court nominee Judge
Harold Carswell] were mediocre . . . there are a lot of mediocre judges and
people and lawyers.”). The Paper makes the somewhat different point that
there are a lot of sociocultural differences, if not sociocultural dissonance,
among judges. See Kim, supra note 4, at 650–51.
14. Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 118–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
aff’d, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
15. See, e.g., DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS
IN CONTEXT 51 (2d ed. 2006); CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY,
CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 47, 78 (3d ed. 2011).
16. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
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a federal judge comes from a “narrow segment of the enormously
broad American socio-economic spectrum,” and, thus, that the
question whether the commercial constituted a serious offer must be
decided by a jury composed of, inter alia, members of the “Pepsi
Generation,” who are, as plaintiff puts it, “young, open to adventure,
17
willing to do the unconventional.”
Plaintiff’s argument was essentially that a federal judge would
view his claim differently than would fellow members of the “Pepsi
18
19
Judge Kimba Wood correctly and deftly laid out
Generation.”
why no reasonable person of any sociocultural category would
regard the commercial as an offer to deliver a military jet costing
more than $20,000,000 to any person who provides “Pepsi Points”
20
worth $700,000.
I. KIM V. SON
21

Kim v. Son, the Article’s first example of sociocultural
dissonance, involved a personal promise by an owner of business
entities to a friend that he would use his own funds to repay loans a
friend had made to the promisor’s business entities.
Not
surprisingly, the promisemaker later became a defendant
promisebreaker.
Not surprisingly, both the trial and the
intermediate appellate court ruled that the “promise to repay the
22
money was entirely gratuitous and unenforceable.”
It is easy to argue that the situation in Kim v. Son is one of
many in which the requirement that a promise be supported by
consideration produces a result that is inconsistent with the
23
The Article, however,
reasonable expectations of the parties.
makes the harder argument that it was the existence of the

17. Id. at 128 (citations omitted).
18. Id.
19. Litigators often say that knowing your judge is more important that
knowing the law. Even discounting the value of this aphorism, before John
Leonard’s attorney made the tactical decision to argue that a jury, unlike Judge
Wood, would be “young, open to adventure, willing to do the unconventional,” he
should have known more facts about Judge Wood—facts such as her being voted
#1 “Superhottie” of the female federal judiciary and her briefly training to be a
Playboy bunny before attending Harvard Law School. See Dave Saltonstall,
Quite An ‘Other Woman’ Brilliant Judge’ll Survive Steamy Divorce Scandal,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 6, 1995), http://articles.nydailynews.com/1995-08
-06/news/17986978_1_harvard-law-school-leboeuf-bunny; Bodacious Babes of
the Bench: The Female Superhotties of the Federal Judiciary!, UNDERNEATH
THEIR ROBES (July 20, 2004), http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/2004
/07/female_superhot.html.
20. Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
21. No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009).
22. Id. at *1.
23. Cf. P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 118 (5th ed.
1995) (“The ‘doctrine’ of consideration is generally seen by lawyers as a set of
rules which limits the freedom of individuals to make binding legal promises.”).
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sociocultural dissonance between the parties and the judge, and not
the existence of the doctrine of consideration, that is to blame for a
result inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.
There are three additional facts in Kim v. Son that seem
important to the Article’s sociocultural-dissonance argument: (1)
both the promisor and the promisee (but not the trial court judge)
were Koreans; (2) “saving face” is more important to Koreans than
24
profit; and (3) “saving face” is the reason that the promisor made
25
From these facts, the Article concludes that if the
the promise.
26
Court had looked to “the social and cultural value of saving face,” it
would have concluded that the promisor’s relief from shame was a
27
“legal benefit.”
I do not know what the adjective “legal” adds to the word
28
I do know the argument that
“benefit” that is not conclusory.
moral obligation should count as consideration has been made at
29
And generally, this
least since the time of Lord Mansfield.
30
argument has been rejected. The reasons for the rejection do not
include sociocultural dissonance.
Even if the judge in Kim v. Son had the benefit of the various
references to Korean culture in the Article, he still would have
concluded that, under the American law of consideration, the
promise was not enforceable. Moreover, if the judge in Kim v. Son
had determined that “relief from shame” was a “legal benefit” for a
Korean promisor whose shame was “so great,” the judge should have
also found that relief from shame was a “legal benefit” for a
Westerner with a less acute sense of shame. A “mere peppercorn’s”
31
worth of shame would have been enough. Again, the result in Kim
24. Kim, supra note 4, at 657–58.
25. Id. Kim’s Article also emphasizes the fact that the note is written in
blood and that “both men had consumed a large amount of alcohol.” Id. at 655.
The Paper then argues that “[t]he drawing of blood then may be understood as
a way to show sincerity rather than as evidence of extreme intoxication” in
Korean culture. Id. at 657.
26. Id. at 658.
27. Id.
28. But cf. Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1961) (“[I]f a mere
moral, as distinguished from a legal, obligation were recognized as valid
consideration for a contract, that would practically erode to the vanishing point
the necessity for finding a consideration.”).
29. “Where a man is under a moral obligation, which no Court of Law or
Equity can inforce, and promises, the honesty and the rectitude of the thing is a
consideration.” Hawkes & Uxor v. Saunders, (1782) 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B.)
1091.
30. See generally JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 67
(4th ed. 2001).
31. See Perrymon v. Bullis, No. B207481, 2010 WL 189047, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 26, 2010) (“All the law requires is a mere peppercorn of
consideration.”). It is not surprising, but regrettable, that both the trial court
and the intermediate appellate court in Kim v. Son used unnecessary (and
misleading) adjectives such as “adequate” and “sufficient” before the noun
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v. Son is inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties
because of the elements of the doctrine of consideration—not
because sociocultural dissonance caused the elements of the doctrine
of consideration to be improperly applied.
II. IN RE MARRIAGE OF WITTEN
32

The Article also uses the case In re Marriage of Witten to
illustrate sociocultural dissonance between the judge and a
contracting party affecting reasonable expectations of a contracting
party.
Witten involved an “Embryo Storage Agreement”
(“Agreement”) entered into by Tamera Witten (“W”) and Tripp
Witten (“H”), who were married and about to engage in the process
of in vitro fertilization. The Agreement provided that W and H’s
stored embryos could “be used for transfer, release or disposition
33
only with the signed approval of both Client Depositors.”
Then, the Wittens divorced. In the divorce proceedings, W
asked for “custody” of the embryos. H did not consent. The trial
court ruled that the dispute over the embryos should be governed by
the Agreement, which required both parties’ consent to any
disposition of the embryos. Accordingly, W did not gain custody of
34
the embryos. The Iowa Supreme Court reached the same result,
taking a very different approach: “judicial enforcement of an
agreement between a couple regarding their future family and
35
reproductive choices would be against the public policy of this
36
state.” In other words—which happily are the words of the Iowa
37
Supreme Court—“we reject the contractual approach.” The court
then decided that, in the absence of a controlling agreement, the
“better principle to apply, we think, is the requirement of
38
Again, this was not a
contemporaneous mutual consent.”
39
contractual approach —the court found that the Agreement was not
enforceable under these facts.
And again, as in the Article’s first-principal case, we see another
court’s applying a contract law doctrine—unenforceability by reason

“consideration.” See David G. Epstein & Yvette Joy Liebesman, Bearded Ladies
Walking on the Brooklyn Bridge, 59 ARK. L. REV. 267, 304 n.192 (2006).
32. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
33. Id. at 772.
34. Id. at 782–83.
35. The court stated that it “must look to the Constitution, statutes, and
judicial decisions of the state to determine its public policy.” Id. at 780 (quoting
Liggett v. Shriver, 164 N.W. 611, 612–13 (Iowa 1917)).
36. Id. at 782.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 783.
39. The court summarized prior judicial treatment of frozen embryo
disputes as following either: (1) a contractual approach, (2) a balancing test, or
(3) a contemporaneous mutual consent model. The court adopted the last
approach. Id. at 774.
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of public policy—that operates independently of the reasonable
expectations of the parties. Decisions like Witten are based on the
premise that “party autonomy is outweighed by some other
40
interest.” The cultural dissonance, if any, in Witten is between W
and the Iowa legislature.
The Article suggests cultural dissonance in Witten between the
presiding judge, Judge Marsha Temus, and W. More specifically,
the Article posits that a woman such as Judge Temus was not
41
“impervious to the male bias prevalent in society” and so failed to
give appropriate consideration to factors such as that “in vitro
42
fertilization is a painful process for the woman [involved]” and that
“the expense and improbability of [(W)] being able to repeat the in
43
vitro process.”
Other articles have used these and other factors to make the
argument that public policy should favor the right of the woman,
who has endured in vitro, to create over the right of the man, who
44
merely supplied the sperm, not to procreate. The Article suggests
a different argument for why W should get the embryos: promissory
estoppel. Professor Kim wrote:
Trip made either an express or implied promise to Tamera
that he would participate in the in vitro process with the goal
of becoming a parent. Tamera acted in reliance upon this
promise when she underwent the physically demanding
procedure. . . . To conclude that Trip’s promise should be
enforceable to the extent of the reliance would permit Tamera
45
to use the embryos.

This assertion is a very creative promissory estoppel argument.
The Article makes an even more creative cultural-dissonance
argument. Recall that the court directly refused to enforce an
express agreement about later use of embryos because of a public
policy to respect “the right of individuals to make family and
46
reproductive decisions based on their current views and values.”
47
And, that public policy came from statutes and case law.

40. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 2 (2d ed.
1998) (discussing public policy as a ground for unenforceability).
41. Kim, supra note 4, at 663.
42. Id. at 661.
43. Id. at 662.
44. See, e.g., Milandria King, Cold Shoulder Treatment: The Disposition of
Frozen Embryos Post-Divorce, 25 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 99, 137 (1999); Ellen
Waldman, Cultural Priorities Revealed: The Development and Regulation of
Assisted Reproduction in the United States and Israel, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 65,
105 (2006) (“Once again, one spouse’s desire to be a biological parent took a
back seat to the other spouse’s interest in avoiding unwanted biological ties.”).
45. Kim, supra note 4, at 667.
46. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003).
47. Id.
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Assume, as the Article argues, that there was cultural
dissonance between the judge and W. And assume, as the Article
suggests, that had there not been any cultural dissonance between
the judge and W, the court would have recognized “an implied
contract between Tamera and Trip whereby each promised the other
48
The same public
to do their part to have biological children.”
policies based on statutes and court decisions that respect “the right
of individuals to make family and reproductive decisions based on
49
their current views and values” should be as applicable to implied
agreements as they are to express agreements.
As with cases involving agreements that are unenforceable
because of the absence of consideration, cases involving agreements
that are unenforceable because of public policy can be used to argue
that contract law does not always enforce and protect the reasonable
expectations of the parties. The argument that such cases—or at
least the two cases in the Article—show that sociocultural
dissonance between the parties and the judge causes decisions that
do not reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties is, in the
50
jargon law professors use, problematic.

48. Kim, supra note 4, at 666.
49. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 782.
50. I have always wanted to use the word “problematic” in a law review
article. So do a lot of other people. A Westlaw search of “problematic” in the
Journal and Law Reviews database showed 5438 hits for 2010.

